Report · Macro

2027 investment outlook: slower growth, a narrower path for policy

Our 2027 outlook: slower U.S. growth, inflation near 2.5%, fewer Fed cuts than markets price, and how we position rates, credit and multi-asset portfolios.

In this report

  1. Economy and policy
  2. Rates
  3. Credit
  4. Multi-asset and macro positioning
  5. Scenarios and risk

Key takeaways

  • We expect U.S. real GDP growth of about 1.6% in 2027, slightly below its long-run trend, with no recession in our base case.
  • Core PCE inflation should settle near 2.5% by late 2027: lower than today, but still above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target.
  • We expect two quarter-point rate cuts in 2027, fewer than markets price. That argues for a moderate long-duration position, not a large one.
  • Credit spreads are tight and leave little room for error. We prefer higher-quality issuers and shorter maturities.
  • Our base case carries a 55% probability. We publish the alternatives and the signals that would move us between them.

1. Economy and policy

Section summary. Growth slows but does not stall. Inflation falls, slowly. The Fed eases with caution.

The U.S. expansion enters 2027 with less momentum than it carried into 2026. Real wage gains have supported consumer spending, but payroll growth has cooled to roughly the pace of labor-force growth, and households in the lower half of the income distribution have spent most of the savings they built earlier in the decade. Business investment is concentrated in data centers, power generation and grid equipment. Outside those categories, capital spending has been flat for a year. Fiscal policy is a modest support: a federal deficit near 6% of GDP adds to demand, but it also adds to Treasury supply, a theme we return to in the rates section.

Inflation is moving in the right direction. Goods prices have stopped falling, and services inflation excluding housing remains firm because it tracks wage growth, still near 3.5%. Shelter inflation should keep easing as newer, lower leases feed into the official measures. Together, we expect core PCE inflation to decline from about 2.8% today to 2.5% by the fourth quarter of 2027.

That leaves the Federal Reserve cautious. We expect the policy rate to end 2027 about 50 basis points below today’s level, with each cut timed to confirm that inflation is still falling. The risk is lopsided: the Fed can move faster if the labor market weakens, but it has little appetite to cut while services inflation runs above 3%.

Base-case path for U.S. real GDP growth and core PCE inflation, 2026 to 2027 Two lines over six quarters from the third quarter of 2026 to the fourth quarter of 2027. Core PCE inflation falls from 2.9% to 2.5%, staying above a dashed 2% target line. Real GDP growth slows from 2.0% to about 1.5% before edging up to 1.6%. 4%3%2%1%0% Q3 2026Q4 2026Q1 2027Q2 2027Q3 2027Q4 2027 Quarter Year-over-year change (%) Fed 2% target Core PCE inflationReal GDP growth
Values are approximate and simplified for presentation.

2. Rates

Section summary. Yields drift modestly lower and the curve steepens. We prefer intermediate maturities to the long end.

Futures markets price close to four cuts over the next eighteen months. Our forecast of two implies that short-maturity yields will fall by less than markets expect, which is why we are not adding duration aggressively. We do expect the curve between 2 and 10 years to steepen as the Fed eases and as the Treasury continues to fund large deficits with longer-dated issuance, which keeps the term premium elevated.

Our preference is the 5- to 7-year sector, where yields compensate for our expected policy path with some margin to spare. The 30-year faces both supply pressure and inflation uncertainty. Inflation-protected Treasuries look fair to slightly cheap against our forecast, and we hold a modest allocation where guidelines permit. Our quarterly view is set out in the fourth-quarter rates outlook.

3. Credit

Section summary. Fundamentals are sound, but valuations are full. We favor quality and short maturities over reaching for spread.

Investment grade balance sheets are in reasonable shape. Interest coverage has slipped from its peak as debt rolls into higher coupons, but leverage is stable and most issuers extended their borrowing when rates were low. The problem is price: spreads sit near the tightest levels of the past two decades, so investors are paid little for the risk that growth disappoints.

We hold an underweight to lower-rated BBB issuers in cyclical sectors and add to A-rated banks and regulated utilities. In high yield, we expect default rates to rise from about 3% toward 4% as weaker borrowers refinance. The 1- to 3-year part of that market offers similar yield with less exposure to a spread shock. Agency mortgage-backed securities offer yields comparable to corporate bonds with less sensitivity to the business cycle.

4. Multi-asset and macro positioning

Section summary. Bonds should diversify equity risk again, but not reliably. We pair them with systematic macro exposures.

As inflation moves closer to target, the correlation between stocks and bonds should weaken from the positive levels of recent years, restoring part of the hedge that bonds used to provide. We do not depend on it. Our multi-asset portfolios hold a neutral equity weight, a modest overweight to intermediate Treasuries, and an allocation to trend-following futures, which have historically tended to hold up better in prolonged, broad sell-offs.

Within equities we prefer broad exposure over concentration in the largest technology companies, whose share of index earnings is high relative to their revenue growth outside AI infrastructure. We expect modest dollar weakness as the gap between U.S. and other developed-market interest rates narrows, which supports keeping part of international equity exposure unhedged. We revisit these weights each quarter, and sooner if one of the signals in section 5 is triggered.

5. Scenarios and risk

Section summary. We assign 55% to the base case. The downside is more likely than the upside, and we state the signals that would move us.

2027 scenarios and assumptions
ScenarioProbabilityReal GDPCore PCE, Q4Fed cutsPortfolio response
Base: slower expansion55%1.6%2.5%50 bpModerate long duration; quality credit
Downside: labor market cracks25%0.3%2.3%150 bpExtend duration; reduce credit risk
Upside: productivity lift20%2.4%2.6%25 bpNeutral duration; add equity risk
Probabilities assigned to three 2027 scenarios Horizontal bar chart. The base case of a slower expansion has a 55% probability, the downside case of a weaker labor market 25%, and the upside case of a productivity lift 20%. 0204060 Probability assigned (%) Scenario BaseDownsideUpside 55%25%20%
Values are approximate and simplified for presentation.

Three signals would lead us to shift weight toward the downside case: average payroll growth below 50,000 a month over three months, core services inflation excluding housing above 3.5% for two consecutive months, or investment grade spreads widening by more than 40 basis points within a month. The investment committee and our independent risk management team review these signals monthly, and we will report any change in this series.

For clients, the practical message is restraint. The base case rewards owning high-quality bonds and staying diversified; it does not reward stretching for yield or concentrating equity risk. If the downside arrives, portfolios built this way should have room to add risk at better prices.

This material reflects the views of the authors as of October 17, 2026, is subject to change, and is provided for informational purposes only. It is not investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Forecasts, scenario probabilities and portfolio responses are hypothetical and are not guarantees of future results. Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal.

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