Spread widening
In a recession or a market panic, spreads on all corporate bonds can widen together, and prices fall even when no issuer defaults.
Fixed Income strategy
U.S. dollar corporate bond portfolios, built issuer by issuer from fundamental research and held inside explicit limits by sector, rating and single name.
The strategy seeks to outperform the Bloomberg U.S. Corporate Index, or a client’s custom credit benchmark, over a full credit cycle, with interest rate exposure held close to the benchmark so that most of the difference in return comes from credit decisions.
It suits investors who want income above Treasuries and are prepared to accept the price swings that come with corporate credit: defined benefit plans extending their liability hedge, insurers matching long-dated reserves, and endowments holding a core bond allocation.
A corporate bond pays a spread over Treasuries to compensate for two things: the chance that the issuer defaults, and the cost of holding a security that is harder to sell. Over long periods the spread has more than covered expected losses for investment grade issuers. The work is to avoid the issuers where it does not.
Most credit losses are visible in the cash flow statement well before they appear in a rating.
Issuer research
The spread is the only part of the yield an analyst can influence. Our research asks whether it pays enough for what could go wrong with this company, in this structure, at this maturity.
U.S. dollar bonds rated BBB− or better by at least one agency, with enough outstanding to trade in size.
Leverage, interest coverage, free cash flow, debt maturities and covenants, compared with sector peers over a full cycle.
The analyst assigns a Lenox rating and the spread the bond should trade at; a second analyst challenges both.
Position size falls as the internal rating falls, so a single BBB issuer can never dominate results.
Issuers with rising leverage, acquisitions funded by debt or a negative outlook are reviewed weekly.
Characteristics
| Guideline | Typical limit | Why it exists |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum rating at purchase | BBB− (Baa3) | Keeps the portfolio inside investment grade at the outset. |
| Bonds downgraded below investment grade | Up to 3% of the portfolio; each position reviewed within 30 days | Avoids forced selling at the lowest price after a downgrade. |
| Single issuer, rated A− or higher | 3% of portfolio | Limits the damage from one unexpected event. |
| Single issuer, rated BBB | 2% of portfolio | Lower-rated issuers get smaller maximum positions. |
| Sector weight versus benchmark | ±10 percentage points | Keeps sector bets proportionate to our conviction. |
| Rule 144A securities | Up to 15% | Allows privately placed issues while protecting liquidity. |
| Currency | U.S. dollar only | Removes currency risk from a credit mandate. |
Risks
Corporate bonds can lose value, and there is no guarantee the strategy will meet its objective. These are the risks we watch most closely.
In a recession or a market panic, spreads on all corporate bonds can widen together, and prices fall even when no issuer defaults.
An issuer can be downgraded to high yield or fail to pay. Recoveries on defaulted senior unsecured bonds are often well below face value.
Corporate bonds trade over the counter. In stressed markets, dealers may quote wide prices or only small sizes.
Prices fall when Treasury yields rise. Long-maturity corporate bonds are especially sensitive.
A leveraged buyout, a large debt-funded acquisition or a share buyback can weaken bondholders’ position overnight.
Issuers may repay callable bonds early when yields fall, returning cash when reinvestment yields are lower.